[Kabar-indonesia] 2: Wesley-Smith & Max Lane: E. Timor: Coup, Mismanagement, Future

[JoyoNews at aol.com]

2 of 2 (2 reports): 

- East Timor: Coup, Mismanagement, Future
  [by Rob Wesley-Smith]

- Max Lane: Analysing East Timorese politics: 
  tentative starting points

'Australians for a Free East Timor' 
Via ETAN
Darwin 
July 7, 2006

East Timor: Coup, Mismanagement, Future

by Rob Wesley-Smith   

The recent sad events in East Timor 
came out of the blue to most people.

Yet was it a planned coup by Australia as some allege?

In an article in The Guardian 6th July Peter Symond seems in no  
doubt.  But to use as evidence that not long before the Australian  
forces were invited over to quell the lawlessness they had prepared  
for such an eventuality is rather tenuous.  Blind Freddy could see  
the need arising.  In early 1999 I led a delegation of activists to  
the North Australian military command to assure them that armed  
intervention to save the East Timorese from Genocide was supported by  
human rights activists.  We had campaigned on the need for armed  
peacekeepers since late 1998.  Blind Freddy could see the need then too.

Ironically in 1999 blind Alexander Downer could not see the need for  
armed peacekeepers, or so he argued, so the UN was powerless to  
enforce its boast to stay and protect the East Timorese in the lead  
up to the 30th August ballot and thereafter.  A couple of years ago  
again it was blind Alexander who argued that East Timor did not need  
and could not expect a modest UN delegation including military and  
police to stay on and help it though its early democratic pains.  It  
is also claimed that Australia deliberately mistrained or avoided  
training the army so it would be ineffective.  Was all this grossly  
negligent policy an attempt to cause a failed state?

I think the jury is out on this one, but maybe.  When you factor in  
Australia's unrelenting tough stance on negotiations over the oil and  
gas spoils of the Timor Sea, where the Australian government has  
taken from East Timor waters over 5 x what it has returned in civil  
aid, and is appropriating to itself half the% to East Timor, one sees  
a determined push to keep East Timor poverty stricken.  They have not  
had an economic dividend from Independence, thus rightly fuelling  
discontent.

But what has Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri's role been in all this?   
Some Left commentators, ignoring all the uniting virtues required of  
a PM in his situation, have argued he is indispensable because he did  
not borrow from the World Bank or anyone else, and that he drove a  
hard bargain on Timor Sea issues.  In 2001 he and Peter Galbraith the  
UN negotiator claimed they were threatened by Alexander Downer,  
exactly with what is not clear, but it could have been that Australia  
would withdraw from the UN over Maritime Boundaries, which it did in  
March 2002, showing a bonsai-Bush contempt for international law.   
But then Alkatiri with fulsome support from Jose Ramos Horta signed  
the Timor Sea Treaty on 20th May 2002, Restoration of Independence  
day, much to the delight of a beaming tricky Alexander, as he knew  
this would limit  East Timor's negotiating position for other areas  
and for Maritime Boundaries.  What brought about this change of  
attitude?  The jury is still out on this one too.  I hope Xanana puts  
a Moratorium on signing or endorsing any Timor Sea agreements until  
after a newly elected government has a chance to reconsider its whole  
position, with a view to getting a fairer share of what is theirs by  
International Law.

East Timor as a country was devastated by the almost complete  
looting, burning and destruction of its towns, many villages and its  
agricultural resources.  You would have thought the UN and  
international community would take steps to help rebuild, but apart  
from some government buildings and some infrastructure this was not  
the case, leaving NGOs and the better off Timorese to shoulder most  
of the burden, and the majority poor population to suffer.   Should  
Alkatiri have borrowed?   Well, once Bayu Undan was locked in and  
substantial revenues were about to flow, then why not?  This could be  
paid back in one year.  Poverty reduction programs were urgently  
needed.  Perhaps if meaningful poverty reduction programs had been  
implemented then the present discontent with the Alkatiri/Fretilin  
government would not have been so volatile.  Whilst I blame Australia  
most for cutting off the funds, Alkatiri must shoulder some blame.

Again the further Left argued Alkatiri has prioritised Agriculture.   
This is poppycock, when the Agriculture budget was not much over 1%   
compared to Health being over 40%.  Yet as I argued in 2000 in East  
Timor - Making Amends, (Lee/Taudevin, Otford), agricultural skills  
and resources could probably solve 80% of the Health problems by  
improved Nutrition (still and even more lately a desperate need);  
improved clean Water supply (ditto); improved Sanitation (ditto for  
refugee camps); and improved Shelter (in Dili now so many houses have  
been destroyed by criminal acts); - the big 4 'NWSS'.

I notice Peter Cosgrove arguing that soldiers not police were needed  
this time around.  This too is poppycock, few threats existed to the  
wellarmed ponderous soldiers, what was needed was police who could  
intervene and take thugs off the streets, and to find out who were  
the ringleaders.  They should have been working with the loyal  
Timorese police, not marginalising them.  Where was their  
intelligence coming from, and what was it if they did get any?  How  
many houses were burned in Dili after the Aussie troops arrived until  
now?  No one will say.  Shades of September 1999 with Cosgrove in  
charge.

So is this recent unrest a coup, or simply discontent and impatience  
with the ruling hardline Fretilin party and its stern leader Mari  
Alkatiri with his negligible PR skills?  Investigative journalist  
John Martinkus revealed that the Timor armed forces leaders had been  
approached by 2 Timorese and 2 mysterious foreigners about a military  
role in removing the government, but he didn't reveal names or  
nationality.  So its still anyone's guess from Australia, Portugal,  
Indonesia, or USA - if forced to choose I would pick the USA, after  
all they have form in this area.

Has there been planning by marginalised groups in East Timor seeing  
no other way out from the Fretilin juggernaut?  Yes.  Does this  
amount to a coup?  Not sure, it may depend on definitions. Do many  
Timorese welcome a government of national unity?  Definitely. This  
should have been installed in 2002 as President Xanana wanted. Most  
international support groups fought for a human rights paradise, not  
for one party.

Deep divisions have now been burned again into Timorese society, so  
what needs to be done to restore a sense of unity and the way  
forward? Fretilin must accept some blame for the recent unrest, as  
apart from its hardline approach, in 2002 Alkatiri appointed as  
Interior minister Rogerio Lobato who had a record of corruption and  
manipulation, then failed at the least to stop him arming civilians.   
Lobato built up the Police at the expense of the Military, which had  
no meaningful role at all.  Alkatiri was reelected recently at the  
Fretilin congress by shows of hands which is against the rules, then  
when Lobato was sacked in disgrace he was elected Fretilin  
vicePresident.  And now they seem to want to change the parliament  
rules to protect themselves, though Alkatiri says he will not seek to  
evade the prosecutors.

Future:
Hopefully a government of national unity will now be installed.  This  
is what East Timor most needs, an ethic of unity.  Over the centuries  
it has been more tribal, with a 'winner take all mentality', and  
jealousy of the next person or group a defining factor - a major  
factor even now.  Perhaps the Indonesian occupation united it against  
the oppressor, but then faced the challenge of a complete change of  
outlook towards constructing a better future.  Many have not done  
this.  The Falintil Defence Forces must be sorted out as an urgent  
first step, overall reduced and better educated, and provided with a  
meaningful role in border defence maybe, civil defence, green corps,  
overseas UN postings, etc, but the factions must be united as an  
example to the nation.

The public service must be chosen on competence not politics, and be  
given rigorous training to be efficient and noncorrupt.  Efficient  
software for suitable accounting is needed, perhaps as developed in  
the NT for easy but comprehensive use by indigenous locals.  A Public  
Service Commissioner to oversee appointments is a must.  Women need  
to be supported for more jobs and less domestic violence.  Education  
must urgently be got back on stream, improved, and made free, or many  
middle class students will be lost to Indonesian schools.  Teacher  
training must be expanded.  Those illeducated jobless macho males in  
Dili must be got into jobs in the countryside if possible.  Poverty  
reduction programs which build better communications, health and  
environment must be implemented.  (If people don't stop burning every  
leaf in sight East Timor will lose its soil, water resources, food  
growing capacity, reefs and trees - this is an urgent national  
priority.)  The border with West Timor should be open to free trade,  
both for competitive reasons and to foil corrupt cartels. Nationwide  
Cultural support and sharing, and Sport as intra and international  
activity given a chance to promote unity (Alkatiri did the opposite  
by banning participation in the last Arafura regional Games).   
Impunity for crimes especially war crimes must not be sacrificed in  
the search for forgiveness and reconciliation.  Discrimination based  
on alleged loromonu/lorosae origin must be outlawed.  Industrial  
development was presaged on development on-land of the Greater  
Sunrise lng project, but this must now be a distant dream given the  
unrest.  And so on.

News to hand is that President Xanana has appointed Jose Ramos Horta  
interim Prime Minister, with 2 of the more competent ministers  
Estanislaus da Silva and Rui Araujo as deputies, and I congratulate  
them all.  Jose will have to act as a PM not a diplomat, (that is one  
who is sent overseas to lie for their country) - Timorese more than  
most need strong leaders.  A strong lead against all forms of  
corruption, which has become almost endemic, will be needed.   
Consistency will be important, but he has worked hard and  
courageously, and as chairman of the board can set a good example.   
Lets hope all get behind these new arrangements.  As Jose is a  
communicator, lets see a flowering of all forms of communication -  
let the 100 flowers bloom.

Meanwhile East Timor will have to accept foreign peacekeepers until  
some of the above gets implemented and bitterness is reduced, until  
after the next election and then for many years a UN presence for  
stability and training.  Should these forces be under UN or Aussie  
command?   Maybe UN but with an Aussie commander.  What we don't need  
is a UN of nationalities doing training and in jobs like 2000/01  
where 80 nationalities sowed confusion.   Should English and  
Indonesian be official languages?  I think so.  In fact if one has to  
drop out it should be Portuguese.  But maybe that's just my Darwinian  
perspective.

An important public seminar on the 'Humanitarian Response to the East  
Timor Crisis' is to be held next Saturday 15th in Sydney, at  
Petersham Town Hall, organised by AETA and 2 Sydney Councils.   
Speakers include the new East Timor ambassador to Australia, the CEO  
of Austcare ex General Mike Smith, and ngo and academic leaders.  A  
concert forms the afternoon aspect, and media and public are  
especially invited, further info (0428) 755 218 or  (02)9519-4788.

-----------------------------------------

>From ETAN
Via Max Lane's Southeast Asia 
and International Affairs blog
July 7, 2006

Analysing East Timorese politics - tentative starting points

by Max Lane

Preamble: These comments are using "information" 
published in the media and "information" being 
circulated on various email lists by supporters 
of either Fretilin or PD. I have received a 
little information also from Avelino da Silva 
(PST) and from the Indonesian dissident academic, 
Hilmar Farid who has been in Dili for the last 
two weeks. The absence of any in-depth written 
analysis from the PST is a major limitation in 
making any assessment at the moment.

Comments:

(1) Tim Anderson's recent article "East Timor 
after Alkatiri: nation or protectorate?" starts 
with a quote from a recent FRETILIN statement:
"We did not expect that the elected leader of a 
party with an overwhelming mandate could be 
forced to stand down in this way in a democracy".

My surprise is that the government as a whole did 
not resign much earlier. In bourgeois politics, 
which is what exists in East Timor, any 
government under which the army breaks up, the 
police disintegrates, civil disturbances break 
out which the government can't handle so has to 
call in 4 foreign powers would almost inevitably 
have to resign. Resignation of elected 
governments in the face of massive policy failure 
is normal in bourgeois politics, usually followed 
by new elections.

(2) Secondly, the FRETILIN government has not 
been toppled. FRETILIN is still likely to 
dominate any new cabinet. There is no way 
FRETILIN can be dislodged from government apart 
from a real military coup, which has not 
happened. What is happening is normal bourgeois 
politics in the aftermath of a destabilizing 
crisis. However until FRETILIN uses up its 
political capital which it possesses as a result 
of its historical role in 1975, FRETILIN will 
remain the majority party in East Timor. It may 
take 5 years or even a decade for that erosion of 
political capital to take place.

(3) Anderson characterizes Alkatiri's policies as 
"modestly nationalistic". Alkatiri is certainly 
the most nationalist of the FRETILIN leaders, 
but not necessarily more than Ramos Horta. 
(Nationalist here is not necessarily 
anti-imperialist, i.e. opponent of imperialist 
policies, but rather protective of ET 
government's own room to manouvre. Both Alkatiri 
and Horta emphasise the need for diversification 
of diplomatic relations. Diversification of 
diplomatic relations is the primary tactic used 
by Alkatiri; bringing in Malaysia and New 
Zealand; calling back the UN as a multinational 
contact point etc etc.

(4) What about Alkatiri's economic nationalism.

(a) negotiations on oil and gas with Australia. 
Alkatiri steadfastly, openly and loudly refused 
to support proposals for mobilizing Australian 
public opinion to pressure the Howard government 
on this issue. On this question he had the same 
policy as Horta. The result was a less than 
optimum deal and the complete failure to assert 
ET sovereignty over ET oil and gas. Alkatiri, 
like Horta, opted for diplomacy rather than 
mobilization - the latter would have strained 
relations with Canberra.

(b) relations with international financial 
institutions. Much has been made of Alkatiri's 
refusal to take loans from the WB. The inital 
declaration of aiming to ensure that East Timor 
remain free of debt was made by Alkatiri and 
Horta jointly. In fact, the Alkatiri government 
has conformed to the dictates of the IMF in the 
most important and fundamental respects. First, 
the ET economy remains predominantly in private 
hands and will become even more so as the 
privatization of state and communal land starts 
to progress later this year and next year, 
Second, and more specifically, the Alkatiri 
government has accepted the IMF wishes that 
ONLY 10% OF INCOME FROM OIL AND GAS 
BE USED FOR INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPMENT 
ACTIVITIES, SUCH AS AGRICULTURE, INDUSTRIAL 
DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION.

The IMF's own assessment of Alkatiri's policies 
is very positive. The IMF is certainly not 
opposed to anything the Alkatiri government has 
done. In March, 2006 the IMF concluded:

" The [IMF] mission supports the authorities' 
development strategy for achieving these 
objectives and the focus on the following core 
policies: a) adherence to the long-term petroleum 
revenue saving policy supported by the Petroleum 
Fund; b) an increase in prioritized development 
spending under the sector investment programs; c) 
the maintenance of a monetary and exchange rate 
regime that preserves macroeconomic stability; 
and d) the rapid establishment of the environment 
needed to promote private sector investment and 
activity. Important movement on this plan has been 
made to date.

The Socialist Party of Timor (PST), which has one 
member of the national parliament and about 250 
positions in various local government bodies, was 
an early critic of the proposal that only 10% of 
oil and gas income be used for development, 
expressing the view that the money should be 
used to accelerate modernization of agriculture 
and other potential areas of production. Investment 
and serious attempts to upgrade East Timorese 
village agriculture have been minimal.

(One of) FRETILIN's contradictions

The current crisis (the break-up of the army and 
disintegration of the Police) is, I suspect, 
connected to one of FRETILIN's key 
contradictions. "Ideologically" and in terms of 
FRETILIN's presentation of itself, i.e. its 
emphasis on presenting itself as the true bearer 
of the spirit of 1975, puts it in contradiction 
with the state building project that it has 
accepted and has been implementing. This is to 
build a typical capitalist parliamentary 
democracy where the state apparatus, including 
the police and army, are supposed to be 
professional and apolitical. Since independence 
the whole of Timorese state apparatus has been 
undergoing training (indoctrination) in this 
approach. This has caused tensions inside the 
Army because there remained inside the Army 
officers who were former guerillas and whose 
primary loyalty is to FRETILIN, i.e. party not 
state. This is no doubt an issue in the civil 
service as well. Party or state? Professional or 
ideological? Partisan or neutral? The whole UN 
backed state building process has been 
inculcating these ideas. (The same issue emerged 
in the early 1950s in Indonesia when almost all 
Army officers with guerilla backgrounds were 
moved out of the army leaving the officer corps 
dominated by men who had worked in the Dutch 
colonial army beforehand.)

FRETILIN has accepted the new state model while, 
at the same time, fostering the idea of an equal 
sign between FRETILIN and the state and fostering 
loyalty to party over state. At the same time, 
however, FRETILIN itself no longer mobilizes, 
politicizes its membership. As an organization it 
itself is more and more a political machine of a 
ruling party. It has attracted a huge number of 
opportunists seeking to be members of the ruling 
party. The loyalty to party therefore loses its 
progressive ideological role. As a machine 
FRETILIN becomes a mechanism of passivity, used 
for electioneering and for mobilizing "shows of 
force" from time to time, often relying on clan 
and patron-client mechanisms to mobilize people..

Conservative versus progressive

The crisis does expose a progressive versus 
conservative dynamic that is developing in East 
Timor post-independence. This is a direct result 
of the adoption of the model of a capitalist 
parliamentary democracy whose ideological 
underpinnings come into direct contradiction with 
what remains of the national liberation ideology 
of the 1970s represented by the NAME Fretilin, 
the flag, patriotic songs, and such terms as 
"maubere" (the oppressed masses, the little 
people), although at FRETILIN's 1999 0r 2000 
congress, the central place of "maubers" was 
reduced.

The development of pro and anti Alkatiri camps 
is, it appears anyway, to be facilitating the 
conglomeration of different elements - 
"professional" army and police, politicians with 
no access to a mass base, the Church - into a 
conservative pole. This also has an echo inside 
FRETILIN among (a) the horde of opportunists 
welcomed into the party by Alkatiri to boost its 
position in the last elections and (b) a more 
ideologically conservative wing.

The Left

The Left is dicided into two rough groupings: (a) 
the PST and (b) the non-party Left, housed in 
NGOs and discussion groups. This second groups, 
includes some progressive youth active inside 
FRETILIN, but who have very small numbers and no 
influence in the FRETILIN machine. Much of the 
"data" used by pro-FRETILIN activists outside 
Timor comes from these groups. Some of these 
groups used to be 'mentored' by the non-party 
Left from Indonesia, but Australians seem also to 
play a role in this sphere now, especially with 
those based in NGOs rather than discussion 
groups, which tend to be Indonesian language based.

The PST is in what amounts to a critical support 
relationship with FRETILIN although restrained by 
the necessity to progress the project of building 
the PST as an alternative to FRETILIN. In the 
recent local elections, it stood against FRETILIN 
and in a few areas roundly defeated FRETILIN.

Neither the PST, which is based in a cluster of 
village areas outside Dili, nor the non-party 
Left have the size or weight to have been able to 
play any role in the recent Dili upheaval. 
(Indeed even FRETILIN, which scored very high in 
the recent local elections in Dili, was not able 
to do anything. Even on June 29, FRETILIN had to 
resort to mobilizing from its provincial bases, 
where it is led by the local elites, to Dili, 
unable to mobilize any significant numbers in Dili.)

The PST, secretary-general, Avelino da Silva, as 
an individual figure is in a specific situation, 
partly separated from the PST as an organization. 
Avelino was appointed by Xanana Gusmao as a 
member of 12 person State Council, which is an 
advisory body to the President. It also includes 
the PM and 5 people nominated by the parliament. 
He has a status as a political personality. It 
has already been announced that he will be a 
candidate for President next year.

It is not impossible that the PST may gain in the 
2007 elections as a result of general 
discrediting of both FRETILIN and Xanana Gusmao. 
(Horta's proactive stance and his frequent visit 
to refugee camps etc may have won him some 
increased popularity).

AUSTRALIAN POLITICS

(1) There is no doubt that the ulta-right in 
Australian politics as represented by the Murdoch 
columnists have a protectorate mentality. This is 
driven by their general desire to entrench a 
racist and xenophobic attitude to the Third World 
by driving home that even in the Xanana and Nobel 
winning Hortoa led new state of ET, there is a 
failed state. This serves to strengthen their 
overall ideological drive among the Australian 
working class. It is also driven by the desire to 
get Australian working class used to the idea 
of an overseas military presence.

(2) However, this is not the only view expressed 
from within the Australian ruling class. Both 
Downer and Nelson have emphasized that pushing 
Alkatori out may actually incite instability 
rather than obtain stability. Political stability 
of the capitalist state in ET is their main 
concern. This was well elaborated also in an 
early SMH Editorial which praised Alkatiri's hard 
work and economic progress and the fact that the 
economy remained in private hands, but argued 
that he should resign for the sake of stability, 
putting the onus on him making the move.

(3) The congealing of a conservative, "post 
national liberation" pole in ET - if it holds - 
may facilitate a more confident stance by the 
Australian political establishment in taking 
sides.

-End 2 of 2-

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