[Kabar-indonesia] 2 of 3: The Rise of the Liberal Islam Network (JIL) in Contemporary Indonesia

[Joyo at aol.com]

-2 of 3-

The Rise of the Liberal Islam Network (JIL) in
Contemporary Indonesia... continues...

Promoting Liberal Ideas 

JIL activists and contributors have written on a wide
range of themes. Many of their articles are responses
to current social issues, for they are interest ed in
issues of public concern. In organizing the articles
written by different authors, JIL's website has made a
thematic index, as follows: the relationship between
Islam and politics, gender relationships, veil (hijab,
jilbab), radicalism and terrorism, interpretation of
Islamic texts (hermeneutics), Islam and the arts,
struggle of faith, polygamy, philosophy of religious
education, the debate on liberal Islam, Islamic law
(Shari`ah), pornography and democracy, and the
American war in Iraq.

To shed some light on where JIL stands on these
issues, we shall discuss the relationships between
Islam and politics, Islamic law, gender, and
terrorism.

Regarding the relationships between Islam and
politics, JIL promotes the separation of religion and
politics, although the authors have different ideas
about the extent to which this separation should take
place. Basyaib, for example, argued that "Islamic
political secularism" is possible and desirable.
Secularism intends to separate religion from politics.
For him, the Iranian case is an example of a
religion-politics integration that has deprived the
people of the clerics (ulama). He asserts: The Iranian
case is the best contemporary example about bad
political systems confiscated by religion, and
therefore it affirms the need for the secular
political system. It always happens when religion and
politics get in bed together. Since the revolution in
1979, Iranian theocracy deprives people of their
ulama, since the mullahs are absorbed into the state
and become rulers. In this blend, the biggest loss
must be endured by the state for the benefit of the
elites. Secularism intends to separate both, by
positioning religion and politics in their own
separate systems.

What's the matter with this separation, and why do
people sturdily oppose it?36 In rejecting the
integration of religion and politics, JIL does not
refer merely to the Middle East. Another JIL activist,
Burhanuddin, points to western cases, referring to the
works of Karen Amstrong, in which kings or queens
dominated both the spheres of religion and politics.
Burhanuddin remarks: Karen Armstrong attempts to
explore chronologically the emergence of
fundamentalist movements in Judaism, Christianity and
Islam from 1492 up to 1999. To Armstrong, the seeds of
the first fundamentalism grew when King Ferdinand and
Queen Isabella conquered Granada and expelled the Jews
and Muslims from that country. They suffered
constantly in a situation full of spiritual alienation
and experienced social, cultural and political
disorientation. This condition led them to a new model
of religiosity, a conservatism which she argues
produced the seeds of fundamentalism.37 In Jakarta on
January 7, 2003, JIL discussed the relationships
between Islam and secularism with Abdullah Ahmed
An-Naim.38 An-Naim, author of Toward an Islamic
Reformation, conveyed the fact that secularism is
historically and sociologically an integral part of
Islamic history.

Islam is provided as a guidance for humanity (hudan li
al-nas), and, therefore, no religious text is "purely"
Allah's revelation. But the text is not present in a
vacant space, for there is always an extracting
process between the divine and the profane.
Furthermore, he said, the text talks about humanity in
the public discourse and, hence, there always has to
be human interference. Secularism is, to him, a
perpetual negotiation between a society's ideals and
its reality. On this occasion, Ulil Abshar Abdalla
affirmed that the Qur'an contained secularist
dimensions or elements, and argued that it was
revealed gradually in order to respond to historical
and sociological events. Furthermore, the asbab
alnuzul (the reasons behind the revelation) indicate a
dialogical process between God as reflected in His
revelations and human needs and conditions.

Many Qur'anic verses, if analyzed semantically, show
the geographical, cultural, economic, political, and
social settings of seventh-century Arab society.

The question of the relationships between Islam and
politics is theologically, historically, and
sociologically a complex one, and thus this discussion
has never ended. In an interview with Robert Hefner,
an anthropologist from Boston University, Ulil
Abshar-Abdalla learned that Islam can play a role in
politics, but only in "proper" manners. Political
Islam should not be entirely eliminated from Muslim
societies, because Muslims have participated in
politics throughout history and will always do so.
What must be promoted is the understanding of Islam as
politically democratic, inclusive, and tolerant. Any
form of political Islam that is at odds with democracy
emphasizes symbols rather than substance, the use of
force rather than the use of democratic and peaceful
means.39 

The debate on religion and politics in Islam is always
tied with the issue of the Shari`ah, often
conveniently translated as Islamic law. JIL activists
generally reject politicizing the Shari`ah, if this is
understood as implementing the ulama's legal rulings.
For JIL, the effort of making Islamic law the public
law is problematic and, therefore, should be rejected.

Islamic law is not monolithic, for it consists of
rulings made by previous scholars that are often
irrelevant for a multi-religious country like
Indonesia. What is more important for JIL is the
substance, or the principles, of Islamic law (maqasid
al-Shari`ah [the Shari`ah's intents], al-kulliyat
alkhamsah [the five universal truths], and hikmat
at-tashri` [legislative wisdom]) that constitute its
five goals: safeguarding people's reason, religion,
spirit, wealth, and honor and family. Ulil
Abshar-Abdalla put the argument in the following
terms: A radical new perspective should be adopted to
transform the dominant perspective among the ummah
nowadays, which I call as "bibliolatristic." We have
to restore the Muslim's awareness regarding what is
described in fiqh tradition as "hikmatut tasyri`," the
philosophy behind the law legislation. In other word,
the ethical aspects of the Islamic teaching should be
addressed persistently and vocally to compete with the
modern fundamentalism tendency which would shallow the
Islamic comprehension as "political ideology" or as a
bundle of teaching which should be followed likewise
since it is God's commandment. The theory about the
religious value or ethical vision must be addressed
clearly. … The ethical vision of Islam actually had
been formulated some of them by the classic Islamic
jurist, which is described as "al kulliyatul khamsah"
(five principle pillars) or "al kulliyatul kubra" (the
magnitude pillars).

That vision is formulated as "safeguarding" upon (1)
reason, (2) religion, (3) spirit, (4) wealth, and (5)
honor and family. The Qur'anic verses should be read
in the light of these ethical visions, on one hand,
and be dialogued with the modern Moslem experience on
the other hand.40 Along these lines, JIL is also very
concerned about equal gender relationships.

JIL believes in the equality of men and women and,
therefore, rejects the fundamentalist view of male
superiority. Muslim women, who have been largely
subordinated in traditionalist and fundamentalist
environments, should be emancipated and empowered so
that they can become independent and equal to their
partners at home and at work. One female JIL activist,
Nong Darol Mahmada, for example, has argued that women
cannot achieve equal status due to the textual
understanding of religious teachings and the
cultural circumstances in which they live. In her
review article on Fatima Mernissi, Mahmadah seems
sympathetic to Mernissi's feminist ideas, especially
her rethinking of the religious tradition of wearing
the veil (hijab, jilbab) and her resistance to
patriarchal establishments in Muslim societies.
Mahmadah wrote: I notice that Mernissi's works stem
from her individual experiences which triggered her to
conduct historical research about things which have
disturbed her religious comprehension. For example, in
her work The Veil and Male Elite which she revised
later as Women and Islam: A Historical and Theological
Enquiry, her investigation of the sacred texts of
Alqur'an and Hadith is based on her individual
experience, as for instance the case of the misogynist
Hadith which equate a female's position to that of
dogs and donkeys. Mernissi's heartbreak deepened when
she heard about Hadith regarding female leadership.
Her motivation to investigate such Hadith seriously
was instigated by the Hadith spoken by a trader in the
market who negated female leadership. Surprised by her
questions, the trader quoted the Hadith that "there is
no salvation within society led by females." To her,
this indicates that the Hadith[s] are embedded within
the Muslim community and that therefore female
leadership is still debatable, despite the case of
Benazir Buttho who became the prime minister of
Pakistan, and despite the fact that Alqur'an discusses
the leadership of Queen Bilqis.41 JIL's discussion on
gender relationships has taken on different issues,
ranging from the veil (is it obligatory?), domestic
violence, polygamy (is Islam polygamous or
monogamous?), to women's political role (can they be
leaders?). A variety of arguments are proposed, but
the tendency of JIL writers is to promote justice in
the sense of men's and women's equal rights and
obligations in all fields of life. One way of pursuing
such a goal is to reinterpret and contextualize
religious teachings related to women.

Apart from the gender issue, JIL writers are concerned
with ethnoreligious conflict, violence, and terrorism.
The main feature of their thought is their outright
rejection of any form of violence and rejection of
using religion to pursue political goals. As an
example, such a comprehension of the relationship
between religion and violence can be seen in the
following selection: Islam is not a religion of
terrorism. But this explanation is unable to reduce
the impression that Islam is a terrorist's net. This
ethical-normative argument is true, although it hides
many facts not only related to the of [the] religious
community, but also related to the religious doctrine.
We must admit that several religious doctrines can be
used to legitimate terrorism, regardless [of] whether
it is right or not.42 It is clear that JIL is
anti-violence and anti-terrorism. However, its
resistance is not simply against Muslim radicalism,
but also against the use of force in international
relations, such as the American war in Iraq. JIL
activists are very critical of American unilateralism
in the Middle East.

Saiful Muzani called the war in Iraq a "chauvinistic
democracy," a democracy that is forced from outside.
Hamid Basyaib described the American occupation of
Iraq as an "illegal genocide." Abd A'la regarded the
American actions in Iraq as "radicalism in the name of
democracy." Nurcholish Madjid said that the rhetoric
of liberating the Iraqi people, as American leaders
claim, is simply nonsense.43 JIL participated in
anti-war demonstrations when the United States
attacked Iraq, and demonstrated its rejection of such
terrorist acts as 9/11 and the bombing in Bali in
2002. Yet, JIL equally criticized the Bush
administration for attacking Iraq without
international support and evidence. On March 24, 2003,
JIL organized a peaceful campaign against the American
war on Iraq, involving several well-known Indonesian
art performers, including Iwan Fals, Franky Sahilatua,
and Trie Utami. Washington's foreign policy in Iraq
caused some dilemmas on how to behave. "When the Bali
bombing occurred," Mahmada, a JIL activist, said: I
thought the fundamentalist groups would fade, because
people would see that they were wrong. But now the
Iraq war becomes a new justification for the
fundamentalist attitude against America or the West.

Everything we've been working for democracy, freedom
of thought – all seems in vain.44 Programs and
Activities 

Within a short period of time, JIL has been able to
attract a growing number of activists and
contributors. Although its membership remains
relatively small, it has increased significantly: from
200 in 1999, to around 500 in 2002, and to more than
1,000 in 2004. Its members come from a wide variety of
professional and educational backgrounds, ranging from
theology, philosophy, and political science to
sociology, history, and economics.

JIL also has been hosting mailing list debates. The
website www.islamlib.com contains information about
the network, as well as editorials, articles,
interviews, talk shows, and schedules. It has
published many articles in some 40 local newspapers,
and has created an organization of Islamic liberal
writers that seeks to collect writings from junior
writers, either already well-known or not yet known by
the public, as inclusive activists.

This organization provides writing materials,
interviews, and articles from national newspapers for
local newspapers, which usually have a hard time
obtaining good writers. With regional autonomy, the
role of the local media becomes increasingly important
in disseminating tolerant religious voices.

So far, JIL has published four books: Discourse of
Liberal Islam in Indonesia, Islamic Shari'a (Law) From
Liberal Islamic Perspective, A Critique of Jilbab
(Islamic Female Headscarf), and The Koran for Women.

For general readers, JIL has published fifty 100-page
booklets in a simple and easy-to-read language as its
response to religious issues of public interest.

The topics include reinterpreting jihad not as "holy
war," but as a spiritual and intellectual struggle,
the Shari`ah as a system of ethics rather than a
system of strict ritualism or legalism, wearing the
jilbab as a personal choice rather than an obligation,
and so forth. In addition, JIL publishes weekly
bulletins on Fridays for distribution in mosques
during the Friday prayer.

JIL also sponsors radio talk shows at Radio Station
68H (Jakarta). These shows were being broadcast by
approximately 15 regional radio stations in early
2001, including Radio Namlapanha (Jakarta), Radio
Smart (Menado), Radio DMS (Maluku), Radio Unisi
(Jogyakarta), Radio PTPN (Solo), Radio Mara (Bandung),
and Radio Prima FM (Aceh). At the time this article
was written, such programs were being broadcast by
approximately 50 radio stations throughout
Indonesia.45 The talk shows bring together
intellectuals from different organizations in
Indonesia that are concerned with Islamic liberalism.
For example, one talk show invited Nurcholish Madjid,
who spoke about the significance of pluralism in the
context of ethno-religious conflicts in recent years.

In addition, JIL has produced a number of public
service advertisements with such themes as pluralism
and the prevention of social conflict.

One of them, "Colorful Islam" ("Islam Warna Warni"),
has been broadcast by various television stations and
even sparked a degree of public controversy, because
some fundamentalist groups were opposed to it. JIL
criticized a bill on religious harmony, designed by
the Department of Religion of Indonesia, on the
grounds that it violates human rights and individual
freedom of religion.46 From a similar point of view,
it also criticized a bill 16 The American Journal of
Islamic Social Sciences 22:1 that criminalizes
interfaith marriage.47 Other cases of similar nature
also took place.

JIL attempts to emphasize its regular discussions held
in the JIL office and elsewhere in collaboration with
various organizations and individuals.

Apart from national figures, international Islamic
figures are invited to discuss certain liberal topics.
Intellectuals from universities have also
participated.

Having seen the growth of Islamic fundamentalism on
Indonesian campuses (public and private universities
and colleges), JIL has begun to turn its attention to
such institutions. As Ulil said: "So we go to the
universities and institutes to provide different views
on Islam. We confront every effort to limit the field
of discussion."48 The syndicated media is considered
the most effective channel, for according to Ulil,
"people's reactions to the articles we published in
the Jawa Post were amazing. I didn't realize it until
I visited local communities, especially in East Java
and Eastern Indonesia."49 Given this focus, JIL does
not use such traditional or conventional methods as
street demonstrations, as some Islamic fundamentalists
do, to gain support.

Instead, it deliberately and cleverly uses various
modern technologies.

This should not come as a surprise, because JIL was
established within the context of technological
advancement. In other words, there would be no JIL
without the Internet. Moreover, JIL used modern
channels and depended upon the current openness of
Indonesian politics and society, which makes these
channels safe, effective, and efficient to use. And
finally, the number of JIL activists was small, which
meant that they had to find ways both to connect
themselves and to attract as many people as possible.

Computer technology was crucial, and Internet
technology was vital.

To broaden its range of audience, JIL used local radio
stations to spread its views, wrote for newspapers and
magazines, and took advantage of television.

They did this in order to reach as many segments of
society as possible.

As a result of this strategy, a dialogue among JIL and
other movements and the audience at large became
possible.

Thus, JIL used strategic tactics to promote its views
and to oppose counter-movements that tend to use
direct attacks and street demonstrations.

The use of modern technologies was encouraged
primarily to reach a broad audience from a relatively
small and scattered network. Through such channels,
the network's activities can be quickly followed by a
broad audience. Consequently, JIL has gained
increasing support. For example, Indonesia's Christian
minority has been sympathetic and supportive of JIL.

In addition, Ismartono supported the idea of separating
religion and politics: "In Catholicism, we don't ask
the government to take care of our affairs."50
Non-Muslim individuals and organizations have joined
JIL programs and activities, and JIL members have
invited non-Muslim intellectuals and figures to talk
about liberalism.

Some Supportive Responses to JIL 

University professors are supportive of the movement,
partly because they learned of JIL through the mass
media. For example, Azyumardi Azra, the rector of the
State Islamic University of Jakarta, has supported
JIL's discourse movement in his writings and public
comments. When a fatwa (religious edict) calling for
Ulil's death was issued by a fundamentalist
institution on the grounds that he had written a
controversial piece in a national newspaper, Azra
contended: No doubt, freedom of expression is a basic
human right … in any expression of thoughts of
feelings by words, drawing, music, performance or
otherwise, a Muslim should observe the values and
ethics of Islam.

Therefore, should any writing or statement contain
controversy, the best way to respond to it is not by
issuing a death fatwa, but rather by proposing [a]
counter argument.51 A number of articles were
published in Kompas to provide moral and intellectual
support for Ulil.52 Hashim Muzadi, then the head of
the Nahdatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia's largest
socio-religious organization, which claims to have
approximately 40 million members and in which such JIL
activists as Ulil were educated, was not too worried
about the young liberal activists' impact. However, he
said that they need to be guided so that they do not
deviate from Islamic principles and norms. Hashim
asked that they create an internal forum for
discussion before they disseminate their discourses to
the general public, so that any potential chaos and
uncertainty could be prevented. But JIL differs from
the NU in that the latter holds the opinions of
classical Islamic scholars as recorded in the
classical reference books.53 In this sense, JIL did
not want to be associated with NU's conservatism;
rather, it wanted to split from the NU's mainstream
viewpoint. As a result, it has become an independent
network.

For example, The Economist, in its May 31, 2003
edition, contained an article on Islam in Southeast
Asia. Its author explained the history of radicalism
in the region and concluded with some appreciation for
JIL. Under 18 The American Journal of Islamic Social
Sciences 22:1 the subheading "Tolerance Reasserted,"
The Economist stated its hope: "The Liberal Mr. (Ulil
Abshar) Abdalla pops up all the time on Indonesian
television and radio shows. As long as the moderates
keep on getting their fair share of air time, there is
every hope that the extremists will fail." The Jakarta
Post also issued several articles emphasizing the need
for liberal Islam to be more active in order to
counter the fundamentalist discourse and movements.

The Fundamentalists Respond 

As shown previously, JIL was a counter-movement to the
Islamic fundamentalist movement. Yet, it not only
provoked a response from the original groups, but also
from fundamentalist movements. From JIL's perspective,
it was the protagonist, the fundamentalists became the
antagonist, and the majority became the general
audience (the silent majority). In common with the
fundamentalists, JIL often makes an "us versus them"
distinction in order to gain wider support. As the
small number of fundamentalists became active and
vocal in the public space, through their
demonstrations, public meetings, and the like and by
taking advantage of the resulting media coverage, JIL
attempted to counter them through non-violent means.

The striking appearance of JIL in Indonesia's mass
media, as well as its activists' intense and active
involvement, the broad range of its programs, and its
increasing level of support with the public, have all
encouraged the fundamentalists to strive for a greater
mobilization, because they see JIL's success as a
threat to their understanding of Islam. One striking
example was given by Ja'far Umar Thalib, leader of
Laskar Jihad (Warriors of God), whom JIL had
criticized. He rebutted the criticism by charging that
JIL's campaign was an attempt to blur the true meaning
of Islam on the pretext of pluralism. According to
him, the JIL movement is a de-Islamization movement.
As he told a reporter: "The difference between us and
them is the difference between Islam and infidels
(kafir)."54 Islamic fundamentalist individuals and
groups became increasingly disturbed by JIL's
promotion of such western ideologies as the concepts
of liberalism and religious pluralism. For
fundamentalist groups, JIL's use of these two concepts
indicated its adoption of western ideologies, which
constituted a deviation from true Islam.55 Hartono
Ahmad Jaiz, a vocal critique of liberal Islam, wrote
in his The Danger of Liberal Islam, that JIL had
blurred the "clear" and "obvious" teachings of Islam
and had caused some doubts among the public about "true"
Islam. He further asserted that those who promote
liberal Islam are all deviants and need to be fought,
or else they will turn Muslims away from Islam.56
Another part of this counter-discourse is Sabili (My
Path), a national magazine that tried to trace the
liberal Islamic movement in the State Institutes for
Islamic Studies (IAIN) around Indonesia, especially
the IAIN in Jakarta.57 Sabili claimed that liberal
Islam was led by thinkers who have studied in western
universities, such as Harun Nasution, a graduate of
Canada's McGill University, and Nurcholish Madjid, a
graduate of the University of Chicago. Liberal Islam
also flourished in such study clubs as the Forum of
Ciputat Students (Formaci), Indonesia's Islamic
Student Movement (PMII), the Islamic Student
Association (HMI), the Institute for a Free Democratic
Indonesia (LS-ADI), the Piramida Circle, Makar, ISAC,
and some others. Sabili charged that these clubs
promote Marxism, secularism, and westernism, all of
which are alien to Islam.58 Thus, the fundamentalists
charged JIL with anti-westernism, given that the
latter promoted concepts that, according to the
fundamentalists, were derived from western
philosophies.

The rise of JIL also triggered the creation of new
counter-movements.

One of them was the Islamic Studies Club of True Islam
(Lembaga Kajian Islam Hanif [Eljihan]), which was
established on November 16, 2003, in Surabaya. Eljihan
intended to recruit members from among the
intellectuals and Islamic scholars from Islamic
boarding schools, as well as from such existing
organizations as the Muhammadiyah, the second largest
Islamic organization in Indonesia, and the hard-line
Hizbut-Tahrir. Eljihan said that JIL had deviated from
true Islam.59 In the case of the interaction between
JIL and the Forum of Indonesian Islamic Scholars
(FUUI), some intention to destroy JIL can be seen: The
counter-movement issued a religious edict (fatwa)
calling for Ulil Abshar- Abdalla's execution. Ulil's
November 2002 piece on "Rethinking Islam" in the
country's largest daily paper, Kompas, sparked
controversy and anger.

A group of religious scholars known as the Forum Ulama
Umat Indonesia (FUUI) in Bandung, West Java, issued a
death sentence on the grounds that Ulil had insulted
the Muslim community and had spread enmity and hatred
throughout society via his writings.

Athian Ali Muhamad Dai, FUUI's head, turned Ulil's
case over to the police, complaining that what Ulil
had written in his article was an evil act against
Islam. Athian said that he had reported Ulil to the
police based on complaints from the Muslim community
in Bandung.

Around 700 people complained. We distributed [a]
questionnaire for this purpose – this was also what
police wanted, proof of how much influence this act
had on society. Some people who were fed up [wanted]
to see Ulil hang.60 Since the counter-movement used
legal tactics, JIL also undertook legal action by
filing a police complaint against FUUI. The result
remains to be seen. But one impact of such an
intentionally damaging effort by the counter-movement
was that JIL's national and international reputation
grew.

Ulil' writings, however, were not responded to in
similar ways, for they created internal disputes among
the fundamentalist groups. Fauzan Al- Anshari of the
Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia – a fundamentalist
organization that counts among its members Abu Bakar
Baasyir, the man accused of complicity in several
terrorist bomb blasts in Indonesia, including the one
in Bali – said that he disagreed with the death fatwa.
He suggested that the decision should be left in God's
hands by way of a mubahalah (mutual cursing). "For
example," explained Fauzan over the telephone, "we ask
for a sign from God within three days, that one of us
should be struck by lighting, and that's how we'll
know which of us is wrong."61 In addition to the death
threat directed against JIL activists, private
television stations eventually cancelled JIL's
television advertisement that promoted Islam's
diversity (Colorful Islam) after being pressured by
such Islamic hard-line organizations as the Majelis
Mujahidin Indonesia (the Indonesian Assembly for
Islamic Fighters) to ban it or else face legal
action.62 Television stations were reluctant to assume
any risk of being charged with "destroying Islam" by
Islamic fundamentalists. In addition, they did not
want to lose their viewers because of this
controversy. In this case, however, JIL did not seem
inclined to take further action to demand that its
advertisement continue to be aired.

Conclusion 

JIL emerged from particular and changing local,
national, and international circumstances. Its
founders saw an urgent need to counter the rise of
Islamic fundamentalism, which was potentially and
actually posing a threat to Indonesia's political
stability and religious tolerance. As an intellectual
network, JIL was established within the context of
regime change, transition, and political openness. It
was primarily a counter-movement designed to confront
the rising fundamentalist movement by becoming
involved in "contentious politics" in its wider sense.
JIL's rise was also connected with the rise of Islamic
reformism in the Middle East. However, its concerns
and discourses differ according to local events and
circumstances.

JIL would not have arisen without the availability and
mobilization of internal resources, including human
resources (the young educated elite and their
knowledge), capital resources, facilities, and, most
importantly, modern communication technology. The
aggregation of these resources is crucial, as is the
erection of a minimal form of organization and
involvement on the part of the individuals and
organizations concerned.

The founders and early activists of JIL discussed and
decided upon particular ideas or frames to be
disseminated to the wider public. Their main frame was
anti-violence, because they perceived that Islamic
fundamentalism promoted violence at a time when
Indonesian society and the government were promoting
political stability and social harmony. JIL believed
that the values of moderation and tolerance had to be
revitalized. Yet, as time went on and JIL became
better known, its founders and activists enlarged the
movement's values or discourses by incorporating
various values and discourses that could help meet the
interests of the Muslim community and the public at
large: the separation of religion and politics,
monogamy, interfaith marriage, interfaith dialogue,
anti-war, and so forth.

This extension was seen as necessary to developing a
more established network with wider support.

JIL members respect different interpretations of
Islam. However, they have chosen to promote one or
more of them through dialogue. They disseminate their
ideas to the public. Internally, JIL is a network of
young intellectuals with different intellectual
inclinations and sets of arguments.

Their interpretation of liberal is not monolithic or
static. What binds them together is their shared
acceptance of such universal values as justice and
peace, their readiness to learn from a variety of
sources, their tolerance of difference, and their
moderation in religious understanding. But these
common features are a result of constant dialogue
within their own groups and among themselves and
others, including the fundamentalists. JIL will
continue to act as an agent of consciousness raising
and cognitive liberation within multi-religious and
multi-cultural Indonesia.

-The text of the paper ends here. 
Part 3 of 3 contains Endnotes-

-end/2 of 3... continues...

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