[Kabar-indonesia] 2 of 3: Papua: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions

[Joyo at aol.com]

-2 of 3-

ICG Papua report continues...

A.  HUMAN RIGHTS AFTER SOEHARTO 

Post-Soeharto governments have made efforts to
acknowledge and redress Papuan grievances, and the
human rights situation has certainly improved with
democratisation, but serious abuses still occur, and
officers responsible are seldom held accountable. This
violence by security forces against civilians is more
the product of a culture of impunity than any
systematic campaign of killings.  Three recent cases
of violence between civilians and security forces are
indicative of the nature of current human rights
problems in Papua. The first began as a scuffle
between a police officer and a local teenager and
resulted in a civilian being shot dead and four others
being seriously injured. The second was a student
demonstration during which the outnumbered police who
tried to break it up with tear gas and rubber bullets
were attacked by students, resulting in the deaths of
five officers. The third incident involved around 100
lightly armed and unarmed civilians obstructing the
arrest of a corruption suspect and a police response
that claimed the lives of three civilians and produced
dozens of injuries.  All these cases were products of
the antagonistic relationship between the community
and the security forces and indicative of the level of
tension in the province. They demonstrate the tendency
of security forces to react with excessive force, but
also that state violence is sporadic rather than
systematic, and that the violence is not always
one-sided.  

1.  The Waghete shootings On 20 January 2006, a minor
dispute turned into a major incident. Two youths from
Puwe Gakokebo village near Waghete in Paniai, Petrus
Pekey and Melanius Douw, tried to charge motorists a
toll for a section of road they had repaired. Police
and soldiers objected. After a brief scuffle, the
youths fled but were pursued by soldiers from Kostrad
Battalion 753, who beat Melanius Douw with rifle
butts. When the unarmed youths tried to run, soldiers
fired at them, killing passer-by Moses Douw and
injuring Petrus and one other. The soldier responsible
for the fatal shooting was sentenced by a military
tribunal to eight months in prison.  

2.  The Abepura riots On 16 March 2006, militant
student protestors refused to disperse despite
repeated negotiation attempts. When riot police
attempted to break up the crowd by force, initially
using tear gas, protestors threw large rocks
(apparently gathered in advance) and bottles at them.
In the clash that ensued, the protestors beat and
stabbed to death three police and a military
intelligence officer. Another police officer beaten by
the crowd died of injuries within a week. Twenty-four
civilians were hospitalised with injuries inflicted by
the police and the mob, including five with gunshot
wounds. Security officers fired mostly into the air
but film footage shows at least one man in plain
clothes firing into the crowd.  In the days after the
clash, police from the same unit as those who had been
killed conducted sweeps of student dormitories,
reportedly beating civilians and firing shots into the
air. A stray bullet hit a ten-year-old girl in the
back.  Ferdinadus Pakage and Luis Gedy, two of the
rioters, were each sentenced to fifteen years for
murder on 2 August, and eleven others received
sentences of between five and six years for lesser
offences. Credible reports have emerged, however, that
some of the defendants were tortured in police
custody. No action has been taken against the Brimob
officers who committed violence against civilians in
the days after the March riots.  

3.  The forced arrest of David Hubi On 15 May 2006,
Brimob police arrested David Hubi at his residence in
Wamena, Jayawijaya. Hubi, the district head (bupati),
had been temporarily removed from office while
corruption charges were being investigated. His
supporters had surrounded his house, some armed with
traditional weapons such as spears and bows and
arrows. Police first attempted to disperse the crowd
with tear gas but within a minute and without warning
shots, according to protestors, fired rubber and live
bullets directly into the crowd. In the clash that
ensued, one police officer was lightly injured, and
three civilians were killed and dozens more wounded.
Several others in the crowd, including a man
interviewed by Crisis Group, were hit repeatedly with
rifle butts. Video footage shows police kicking and
beating unarmed protestors sitting passively on the
ground, then herding them into trucks for transport to
the police station.

Police argue that one of Hubi's supporters fired an
arrow first; picketers interviewed by Crisis Group
insist that police fired on the crowd unprovoked. Even
if a Hubi supporter had shot an arrow at an officer's
leg, as police claim, the response of the security
forces was vastly disproportionate.  Three of Hubi's
supporters, described by police as "masterminds" of
the picket, are being tried for threatening violence
and obstructing arrest. Yet, no police officer is
under investigation for possible use of excessive
force. Papuan provincial police spokesman Kartono
Wangsadisastra stated that officers had "acted in
accordance with police procedure" and that if they had
not fired on the protestors, they would have been in
grave danger. Victims plan to pursue their case
through the human rights court in Makassar with the
help of the National Human Rights Commission.

B.  WHAT ARE THE CHANCES POLITICAL ACTIVISTS WILL BE
ARRESTED, DISAPPEARED OR KILLED? 

Political activists are likely to be arrested on
rebellion (makar) charges for raising the Papuan
nationalist symbol, the "Morning Star" flag, and can
face sentences of up to twenty years. They are also
likely to be beaten and kicked during and immediately
after arrest and to face worse treatment if their
actions involved violence.  The likelihood that
pro-independence leaders or human rights activists
will be disappeared or killed is low but the fear in
Papua is real, based on two cases. One is the November
2001 killing of prominent independence leader Theys
Eluay by members of the Indonesian army special forces
(Kopassus); the other is the September 2004 murder by
arsenic poisoning of the Jakarta-based human rights
lawyer Munir. One person has been convicted in the
latter case but he clearly did not act alone, and
questions of involvement by members of the National
Intelligence Agency remain unanswered.

Eluay's death may have taken place in the context of a
covert plan to target influential independence
leaders, but even if so, political circumstances have
changed. Supporters of such tactics, including the
then-military commander, Mahidin Simbolon, and the
then-army chief of staff, Ryamizard Ryacudu (who
termed the killers "heroes") have been systematically
sidelined.  No extrajudicial tactics have been
employed by the Yudhoyono administration, but its
failure to pursue the Munir investigation and to press
for greater accountability in the Eluay case beyond
the low-ranking Kopassus soldiers convicted ensures
that the fears of Papuan activists will remain high.  

II. ARE THERE MUSLIM MILITIAS IN PAPUA? 

Solidarity groups periodically raise the spectre of
hard-line Muslim militias working with the army in
Papua, which is predominantly Christian. Little hard
evidence exists. The salafi militia Laskar Jihad had a
few hundred men in Sorong, in what is now West Irian
Jaya, in 2001, but the organisation disbanded in
October 2002, and there is little reason to believe it
survived in Papua when it collapsed everywhere else.
Jemaah Tabligh, a non-political missionary
organisation, has had a presence in Papua since 1998,
and its members, who often wear long white robes and
turbans, are frequently confused with Laskar Jihad.
They focus on making Muslims better Muslims, not jihad
activity.

The influx of migrants has raised fears among some
Papuans about cultural domination by non-Papuans and
"Islamicisation". Some Muslim groups do have active
proselytisation programs in Papua, but nothing to
compare to the Christian evangelical movement, which
is large and growing. The Hidaytullah Islamic school
network, based in Balikpapan, East Kalimantan, is
particularly active in Papua, with schools in Merauke,
Wamena and Jayapura.  

III.    IS PAPUA CLOSED, AND IF SO, WHY? 

Access to Papua is restricted but not completely
denied. Tourists may travel relatively freely, but
there are restrictions on the entry of foreign
journalists and NGOs. No particular region has been
publicly designated a no-go area, but some NGO staff
were denied permission to travel to parts of Puncak
Jaya district in 2005 when military operations were
underway.  Persons wishing to travel to the province
for other than tourism must apply to the police for
permission, listing each proposed destination and the
purpose of the visit. Diplomats need to apply to the
ministry of foreign affairs. Permission is not usually
denied outright to diplomats but they are sometimes
asked to delay their trips. NGOs must apply for
permission, which is usually granted, but those deemed
to be conducting "political activities" are closely
monitored.  There has been a formal ban on foreign
journalists entering the province since 2003.

Several Jakarta-based correspondents have received
permission to visit in 2006, however - to work on
non-political or human rights-related stories - even
to sensitive areas in the central highlands. The
official reason for the restrictions is that foreign
reporters would be used as a platform by Papuan
political activists, possibly "threatening Indonesian
unity and cohesion". If the restrictions were lifted,
however, Papua-related stories in the international
media might reflect more nuance.

IV. WHAT CAN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY DO? 

The most useful assistance the international community
can provide to Papua is development aid. Some
particularly useful projects could include: 

-   technical assistance to improve the capacity of the
district and sub-district governments to deliver basic
services, especially in education, health and
livelihoods;  

-   training for provincial, district and sub-district
governments in development planning and budget
management; 

-   assistance to the MRP to enhance its ability to
fulfil its mandate of safeguarding Papuan culture and
values and act as an interlocutor with Jakarta; and 

-   assistance to civil society groups to monitor and
report on local corruption.  Both the World Bank and
the United Nations Development Program have recently
embarked on multi-donor projects to work with the
provincial governments on these very issues. The World
Bank's donor meeting in Jayapura on 27 September would
be an ideal opportunity to discuss and coordinate
international assistance to Papua.

Because resentment of the security forces remains
high, donors could work with the Indonesian government
on expanding local recruitment strategies for police,
building on efforts initiated by then provincial
police chief I Made Pastika in 2001 and 2002. It is
particularly important to work out training and
incentive strategies to ensure that Papuans begin to
fill middle and senior management positions.
Increasing military accountability in Papua, both in
terms of financial transactions and human rights, will
ultimately be key to lessening that resentment.

Persuading the Indonesian government to lift
restrictions on the access of foreign journalists
would help to provide more balanced reporting inside
and outside the country.  At the moment, there is
probably not very much that the international
community can do to facilitate dialogue between
Papuans and the central government, given the latter's
sensitivities. But technical assistance could help in
a process of consultation across the two provinces to
discuss revisions to the special autonomy package so
that Papuans have a genuine sense of ownership of the
amended law.

Jakarta/Brussels, 5 September 2006 

-End of text... footnotes follow in 3 of 3...

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Joyo Indonesia News Service
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