[Kabar-Irian] Irian News - 12/4/03 (Part 2 of 2)

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- Heinous Crimes Committed by Timbul Silaen & Eurico Guterres
*****************************

From:  Joyo Indonesia News

The book 'Masters of Terror,' contains the most complete set of profiles 
available so far of the key suspects in the 1999 destruction of East Timor.  
The book aims to support the cry for justice in East Timor. 

Col (Pol) Timbul Silaen
East Timor police chief (Kapolda)

Col Timbul Silaen came from assistant police chief in Central Sulawesi to be 
appointed East Timor police chief on 30 March 1998 (another source says 22 June 
1998. In that year he was an appointed member of the supreme legislative 
assembly the MPR, representing the regions.)[1] He turned 51 in August 1999. He 
was nominally in charge of security in Indonesian East Timor for all of 1999 
except during the short period of martial law after the ballot. 

Timbul Silaen took part in meetings with military and militia leaders where 
violence was advocated and planned, he permitted militias to carry weapons and 
operate roadblocks, and he failed to act against those who committed violence 
even when overwhelming force was available to him (as during the Maliana police 
station massacre) see LtCol (Pol) Budi Susilo). Some policemen under his 
command took part directly in violence against civilians - notably in Liquica 
on 6 April 1999 and in Suai on 6 September 1999. Unamet chief executive Ian 
Martin writes that the deportation of East Timorese after the ballot was 
coordinated by the police. Martin was referring to Rencana Operasi Hanoin 
[Hanoen] Lorosae II, which Silaen drafted in August 1999.[2]

More broadly, the police were part of the repressive apparatus of the state 
that stretched down to the village level all over East Timor. The village 
police officer (Bimpolda - Bimbingan Polisi Desa), was one of three officials 
who made up the key institution of the state at this level, known as Tripides 
(Tri-Pimpinan Desa). Its other two members were the village chief (Kepala Desa) 
and the village NCO (Babinsa - Bintara Pembina Desa).

However, with the police still part of the armed forces in 1999, and still 
treated there as the 'little brother' of soldiers, Timbul Silaen's actual 
authority was much less than his formal one. “Every time I met withTimbul 
Silaen,” Portuguese diplomat Ana Gomes told journalists, “the guy let me 
understand he was not in control.”[3]

Throughout his term in East Timor, Silaen consistently failed to act against or 
even condemn violence committed by groups in favour of East Timor's continued 
integration with Indonesia. Among the examples are the following:

In an interview in mid-1998 he downplayed 'ninja' violence against civilians as 
mere 'naughtiness'.[4]

Admitting the incarceration of villagers in the Liquica district by pro-
Indonesian militias in April 1999 (in conditions journalists described as 'like 
a concentration camp'), Timbul Silaen did nothing and merely said: 'At most, 
there are 100 [people being held], and they are from the pro-independence 
faction.'[5]

When this situation deteriorated into a massacre of refugees in the church in 
Liquica on 6 April 1999, he again downplayed it as fighting between two groups, 
and ignored eyewitness reports of direct police involvement in the killing.[6] 

Still in April 1999 he refused when asked to give a guarantee of security for 
the territory's only local newspaper, Suara Timor Timur, after it had been 
closed down by militias who said they disliked the tone of its reporting.[7] 

In June 1999 he defended the appointment of notorious militia leader Eurico 
Guterres as chief of a civil defence force based in Dili, saying: 'We have yet 
to find evidence that Guterres and [Manuel de] Sousa were involved in the 
recent murders.'[8]

In the meantime, in contrast with his tolerance of violence committed by anti-
independence activists, he did act rather vigorously in two cases of violence 
committed by pro-independence activists. These included the killers of Fernando 
Maia, who was murdered in Salesa on 12 July, and Joao da Silva, who allegedly 
killed an Aitarak militiaman on 29 August.[9]

Throughout 1999 he attended many meetings with military and militia leaders at 
which plans were made to commit, orchestrate or condone violent acts. We know 
the dates of only a few of these.

The most damning evidence of the kind of agreements reached at such meetings 
was given by militia leader Herminio da Costa to US journalist Allan Nairn.  He 
told Nairn that Timbul Silaen and Tono Suratman had since January 1999 issued 
him and other militia leaders with immunity from prosecution in the case of 
militia attacks on CNRT leaders - including interrogation, assaults on their 
houses, or even their deaths.[10] 

In early April 1999, Timbul Silaen attended a meeting in Gleno, Ermera, in 
which East Timor Governor Abilio Soares said that the safety of those civil 
servants who refused to sign a statement of support for autonomy (within 
Indonesia) could not be guaranteed. 

On 1 May 1999 he attended a meeting at Oesilo (just inside the Oekussi/Ambeno 
enclave), together with East Timor military commander Col TonoSuratman and 
governor Abilio Soares. In front of 2000 people, government officials held 
speeches in which among others they said the CNRT should no longer be allowed 
to exist.[11] Two days later, he and East Timor military commander Col Tono 
Suratman attended a ceremony in the Ambeno enclave where the local 
CNRT 'voluntarily' dissolved itself and said it had given up the idea of 
independence. Other CNRT leaders suggested the dissolution was forced on the 
Ambeno branch.[12]

Militias launched attacks around Dili for two days on 9 and 10 May in which 
police acknowledged four independence supporters died. Timbul Silaen took no 
action, and merely described the attacks as fighting between two East Timorese 
sides.[13]

Immediately after this round of violence, on 11 May, he allegedly attended a 
meeting with Tono Suratman, Domingos Soares, the Kopassus counter-insurgency 
unit SGI, and militia leaders at the East Timor military headquarters in Dili. 
The meeting discussed plans to conduct a second phase of the so-called 'Operasi 
Sisir' (Combing Operation) of 17-19 April. This second phase, planned by Tono 
Suratman, was to be executed by militia groups from 15 to 25 May under the 
motto 'Autonomy or Death'.[14] 

On 24 July 1999 Timbul Silaen allegedly took part in a secret meeting at the 
East Timor military headquarters, together with military commander Tono 
Suratman, the provincial parliamentary speaker (Armindo Soares Mariano), and 
militia leaders. The meeting discussed plans for a scorched earth campaign in 
East Timor in the likely event of the pro-independence vote winning. Police and 
military personnel were assigned to 'assist' the Aitarak militia, which would 
play the central and most visible role.[15] 

When just before this meeting a letter was leaked to the media in which the 
Aileu district allegedly passed on instructions from the armed forces commander 
(Gen Wiranto) ordering militia leaders in his district to harass Unamet 
officials, Timbul Silaen took a strong role in denying the letter's 
authenticity.[16]

A week before the referendum Timbul Silaen held a meeting at his office 
attended by senior police and military commanders, provincial government 
officials and referendum taskforce members. Quoting his own intelligence 
estimates, he told the meeting the vote would be close and that there would be 
large-scale bloodshed whatever the outcome of the referendum. He recommended 
drawing up plans to evacuate half the population or 250,000 people. The meeting 
made available aircraft, ships and 300 local government trucks for the 
evacuation.[17]

He did not react well to the UN police force (civpol) that came to East Timor 
to “assist” Indonesian police in the run up to the referendum, warning there 
could be “misunderstandings” if they were perceived to be sympathetic to the 
pro-independence side.[18]

On 5 September 1999, the day after the ballot result was announced, his office 
failed to respond to pleas for assistance from a priest at the Catholic 
diocesan chambers in Dili. Police and soldiers stood by as Aitarak militiamen 
invaded the compound and killed about 15 people (see Mateus de Carvalho). He 
was at that moment attending a meeting at the official residence of East Timor 
military commander Col Nur Muis. Gen Wiranto was also in attendance. Bishop 
Belo was pleading for action against the militias. 

Bishop Belo had asked Timbul Silaen on 2 and 4 September for protection against 
the militias at his own residence, where over 5000 refugees were sheltering. 
Timbul Silaen had visited the residence but did nothing. Early in the morning 
on 6 September, according to the Dili indictment against Silaen (Case 13/2003), 
Bishop Belo phoned Timbul Silaen again asking for protection from militias 
milling about his residence. However, Silaen told Belo to contact Col Nur Muis, 
as the police could not help. He only sent an officer (BrigGen (Pol) J D 
Sitorus) to “save” Bishop Belo after obtaining the permission of the military, 
who had by then emptied the compound of all the refugees. Brimob police 
personnel were among those who organised the attack (see LtCol Sujarwo). Before 
helicoptering him to Baucau, Silaen told Bishop Belo that it was necessary for 
police to take the action they did because whenever there was a problem the 
Timorese always sought shelter with the Church. 

Timbul Silaen's human rights record in 1999 was not all negative. Unamet chief 
executive Ian Martin in his book praised Timbul Silaen for his 'active 
involvement' in 'addressing particular local problems of intimidation'.[19]  
The reference was to July 1999, but it could also have applied to April, when 
he sheltered CNRT leaders Leandro Isaac and Manuel Carrascalao following 
militia attacks on them and their followers.[20]

However, these were small victories amid the great failures that represented 
his tour of duty in East Timor. A UN High Commision on Human Rights delegation 
to East Timor questioned his ability to maintain security.[21] The East Timor 
human rights organisation Yayasan HAK said more straightforwardly: 'Clearly, 
the security situation has failed to improve not because of "conflict between 
the two sides" but because terror and intimidation by the pro-integration 
militias has been allowed continuously to go unchecked by the police and the 
military in East Timor.'[22]

Speaking in his own defence, Timbul Silaen usually blamed the 'extremely 
brutal' character of the militias for his own failure to act.[23] Others 
rejected this defence by pointing out that he had a vastly expanded police 
force at his disposal that should have permitted him to control the militias. 
In June 1999 an additional 3,100 Brimob elite policemen were brought in from 
outside (the so-called Lorosae Contingent) and placed under his command. 
Together with 1,000 'civil defence' members (Kamra), this gave him 8,000 men.
[24] 

After the East Timor ballot Timbul Silaen was promoted to Brigadier General and 
became first head of the police anti-corruption force at national headquarters, 
then head of the anti-narcotics unit. In February 2001 he was reassigned to a 
special team to track down the fugitive son of President Suharto, 'Tommy' 
Suharto (thus compounding his own record of consistent failure). In June 2001 
he revealed that his personal wealth stood at Rp 1.2 billion (US$100,000). 

He was quizzed extensively about his responsibility for the 1999 abuses in East 
Timor - first in January 2000 by KPP HAM and again in May 2000 by the Attorney 
General's team. KPP HAM investigators revealed that an unnamed witness had said 
Timbul Silaen ordered police to take part in killing and destruction in East 
Timor.[25] However, when KPP HAM named him as one of those responsible for the 
East Timor mayhem, his superiors dismissed the report as biased to the pro-
independence side.[26] 

The weaknesses of the Indonesian Attorney-General's indictment against him and 
against Abilio Soares are described in a May 2002 report by the International 
Crisis Group.[27] The indictment before the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court in 
Indonesia of 20 February 2002 was for crimes against humanity. It specifically 
held him responsible for failing to order his subordinates (including named 
militia groups!) to prevent the Liquica massacre of 6 April 1999, the attack on 
Manuel Carrascalao's house on 17 April 1999, the attack on the Unamet office in 
Liquica on 4 September 1999, the attack on the Dili Diocesan office on 5 
September 1999, and the attack on Bishop Belo's residence on 6 September 1999.  
After a trial that was widely criticised outside Indonesia for failing to 
address the available evidence, he was acquitted on 15 August 2002.[28]

On 28 February 2003 Timbul Silaen was indicted in absentia for crimes against 
humanity before the Dili special panel, specifically over his responsibility 
for the attacks on the Dili diocese and Bishop Belo’s house on 5 and 6 
September 1999 respectively, and for his role in forcibly transferring over 
25,000 civilians from Dili to West Timor between 5 and 9 September. Eurico 
Guterres was also indicted over this. 

Several district police chiefs under his command have also been indicted for 
crimes against humanity, before the Jakarta ad hoc court and/ or the Dili 
special panel. They are LtCol (Pol) Hulam Gultom (Dili), LtCol (Pol) Budi 
Susilo (Bobonaro), LtCol (Pol) Gatot Subiaktoro (Covalima), and LtCol (Pol) 
Adios Salova (Liquica). 

Extra Information
Implicated in Events:
Belo - 6/09/1999 - Attack on Bishop Belo's house, Dili
Carrascalao - 17/04/1999 - Murder of 12 at home of Manuel Carrascalao, Dili
Diocese - 5/09/1999 - Attack on Dili diocesan office
Liquica - 6/04/1999 - Liquica church massacre

Current Status:
T - Committed for trial in East Timor, some already sentenced. 
A - (Indonesian) Attorney General's Department. Announced as suspects at  
various times (September 2000 - April 2001), some later dropped, some already 
sentenced. 
K - KPP HAM. Listed in the 31/01/2000 report of the Indonesian commission of 
inquiry into atrocities committed in East Timor in 1999. More junior figures in 
Appendix 5 of the final report are added here under their superiors. 
D - Dunn. The report of James Dunn, consultant to the Untaet Prosecutor General 
Mr Mohamed Othman, April 2001. 

See map of location 
This individual is also mentioned in these profiles: 
Mateus de Carvalho 
Herminio da Costa 
MajGen Adam Damiri 
Manuel de Sousa 
Eurico Guterres 
Col Nur Muis 
Laurentino ('Moko') Soares 
LtCol (Pol) Gatot Subiaktoro 
Col Tono Suratman 
MajGen Kiki Syahnakri 

---------------------

[1] Waspada, 13 August 1998.
[2] Ian Martin, Self-determination in East Timor: The United Nations, the 
ballot, and international intervention, Boulder (Col): Lynne Riener, 2001, 
p.96. 
[3] Don Greenlees and Robert Garran, “Birth of a nation: Army's deadly double 
game”, The Australian, 21 May 2002.
[4] 'Wawancara Kolonel (Pol.) Drs. GM. Timbul Silaen: "Ninja adalah kelompok 
pengacau yang sporadis"', Tempo, 25 July 1998.
[5] Keith B. Richburg, 'A campaign of terror: Army-backed militias use violence 
to sway vote on E. Timor independence', Washington Post, 9 May 1999.
[6] 'Uskup Belo, Danrem Tono dan Kapolda Timtim Silaen tinjau situasi Liquica', 
Suara Timor Timur, 8 April 1999.
[7] 'Empat wartawan diburu Kopassus', MateBEAN, 29 April 1999.
[8] 'Police advocate militia chiefs appointment', The Jakarta Post, 10 June 
1999.
[9] 'Clash mars East Timor registration', The Jakarta Post, 17 July 
1999; 'Fortilos: Situasi Dili 1/9/99 - 21:00', SiaR, 31 August 1999 [the title 
of this report is probably mistaken - it should be 31/8/99].
[10] Allan Nairn, 'License to kill in Timor' , The Nation [NY], 31May 1999.
[11] Amnesty International, 'EAST TIMOR: Seize the moment', 21 June 1999, ASA 
21/49/99.
[12] 'CNRT Ambeno bubar, terima otonomi luas: Tolak jajak pendapat', Kompas, 3 
May 1999.
[13] 'Wartawan asing berperan dalam aksi demo di Dili', Pos Kupang, 12 May 1999.
[14] 'Fortilos>FPDK: Otonomi atau mati', MateBEAN, 18 May 1999.
[15] 'Skenario bumi hangus TNI dijalankan di Timor Timur', MateBEAN, 9 
September 1999.
[16] 'Propaganda hitam merajalela di Timtim: Bupati Aileu mengadu ke Polda', 
Kompas, 23 July 1999.
[17] Don Greenlees and Robert Garran, Deliverance: The inside story of East 
Timor's fight for freedom, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2002, p.206.
[18] 'Indonesian police warn of "misunderstandings"', Sydney Morning Herald, 6 
May 1999.
[19] Ian Martin, Self-determination in East Timor: The United Nations, the 
ballot, and international intervention, Boulder (Col): Lynne Riener, 2001, p56.
[20] 'CNRT bubar, ikut pro-integrasi', Kompas, 27 April 1999.
[21] 'PBB minta penegakan hukum di Timtim', Kompas, 23 May 1999.
[22] 'HAK: Laporan pemantauan masa pendaftaran, 26 Juli - 8 Agustus 1999', 
MateBEAN, 10 August 1999.
[23] 'Kesepakatan damai Timtim: Hari ini ditandatangani', Kompas, 21 April 1999.
[24] The Kontingen Lorosae were commanded by Brig-Gen Pol James Daniel Sitorus, 
mentioned above as 'saving' Bishop Belo. Since Sitorus outranked Timbul Silaen, 
it is not clear in what sense this additional unit was actually under Silaen's 
command. The Kontingen Lorosae was part of a police operation named 'Hanoin 
Lorosae', with its headquarters at the East Timor police headquarters in Dili. 
It may be that these elite police acted directly under the command of Jakarta, 
perhaps even directly of General Wiranto, under whose command the police still 
fell in 1999. ('Skenario bumi hangus di Loro Sa'e', Tempo, 19 September 1999, 
pp28-29. One of the sources for this long report, though not for the info 
above, is a Carter Center weekly report, no.4, written by Annette Clear.) 

We do not yet know a great deal about Hanoin Loro Sae - for example, how did 
these special police forces interact with the military officers here named? 
However, see 'Wiranto kritik oknum Unamet', Kompas, 29 July 1999; '8.000 
Personel Polri amankan jajak pendapat', Kompas, 1 June 1999. 

Curiously, the ceremony marking the arrival of these elite police 
reinforcements on 5 June 1999 was also marked as the moment at which the 
police 'took over' control of security over East Timor from the military. 
Policemen told Unamet staffers that East Timor before this was in a state of 
war and thus not under police control. ('Police take over security in E. 
Timor', The Jakarta Post, 6 June 1999). The facts on the ground certainly 
strengthen the impression of a continuous state of war since the invasion of 
1975. However, the military have never formally acknowledged that East Timor 
remained in a state of war until 5 June 1999.

[25] Lindsay Murdoch, 'Militiaman implicates generals', Sydney Morning Herald, 
1 December 1999. Another report said a police witness in the Timbul Silaen case 
was Guntur Gatot Setiawan, chief of the patrol directorate at East Timor police 
headquarters (Kadit Samapta Polda Timtim). Was this the witness referred to by 
Lindsay Murdoch? ('Letkol Asep Kuswandi tidak datang', Kompas, 13 September 
2000).

[26] 'Polri tidak akan tindak langsung: Timbul Silaen', Suara Pembaruan, 3 
February 2000.

[27] 'Indonesia: Implications of the Timor trials', International Crisis Group, 
8 May 2002 (www.crisisweb.org).

[28] Indictment availabe on 
http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~warcrime/indictment4_1.htm. Other documentation 
on http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/Indonesia/accusedindo.htm. The judgment is also 
available on the JSMP website.
*******
Eurico Barros Gomes Guterres     

Aitarak militia commander, Dili; deputy commander militia umbrella organisation 
PPI

Eurico Guterres was the most prominent militia leader in East Timor in 1999. He 
was always more a street fighter who followed the money than a political 
player. On 10 or 12 August 1998 he and several other men who were to lead 
militias in 1999 (Joao Tavares and Cancio de Carvalho) met with East Timor 
military commander Col Tono Suratman and Udayana military area commander Maj-
Gen Adam Damiri. The military men told the East Timorese they must organise 'to 
protect integration'. This was the launching date of an East Timor-wide militia 
movement devised over the previous two months by Maj-Gen Sjafrie Syamsuddin and 
Maj-Gen Zacky Anwar Makarim.[1] 

In January 1999, either just before or after the day that President Habibie 
announced the independence ballot, MajGen Adam Damiri appointed Eurico Guterres 
head of a long quiescent militia organisation called Gardapaksi (or Gadapaksi). 
He gave him Rp 50 million (about US$6000 at the time) to revive it.[2] It was 
renamed Aitarak, but most of its members had been in Gardapaksi. Some were 
active members of Kopassus. Leaked Indonesian army documents[3] establish that 
Aitarak was a regular part of the Indonesian armed forces. He boasted to 
journalists that he took his orders directly from Adam Damiri, and told others 
he communicated with Maj-Gen Zacky Anwar Makarim.[4]

Throughout 1999 he engaged in numerous acts of violence and intimidation, while 
staying in intimate contact with top Indonesian military and civilian 
officials. 

On 26 February 1999 he and another militia leader, Cancio de Carvalho, faxed a 
death threat to Australian journalists in Jakarta intending to cover East 
Timor. On 30 May 1999 he again threatened to kill Australian journalists.[5]

On 26 March 1999 he attended a meeting in Dili with other senior militia 
leaders including Joao Tavares, as well as Governor Abilio Soares, and military 
commander Col Tono Suratman. At this meeting Governor Soares allegedly urged 
that pro-independence nuns and priests should be killed. It was one of several 
such meetings throughout February and March 1999.  

On 6 April 1999 he played a role in the run-up to the Liquica church massacre, 
though he has not been indicted for his role in it (see Leonito Martins and 
LtCol Asep Kuswani).  

On 17 April 1999 he was recorded on national and international television as 
inciting his own and thousands of other militiamen from every district in East 
Timor gathered in a rally of 3-5000 to kill pro-independence supporters. The 
rally, to launch an anti-independence 'cleansing' campaign in Dili, was 
attended by the governor and all top government and military officials in East 
Timor. At this rally Eurico Guterres was made deputy commander of the combined 
pro-integration forces PPI (Pasukan Pro-Integrasi), a military-backed umbrella 
grouping of militias nominally led by Joao Tavares. 

He delivered an inflammatory speech urging his men to 'capture and kill if you 
need' those who had 'betrayed integration'. He singled out the family of former 
parliamentarian Manuel Carrascalao as 'traitors'. He concluded by stating that 
I, Eurico Guterres, 'will take full responsibility'. He then led one group of 
militia men and TNI members on a rampage around Dili, resulting in thirteen 
deaths. 

The group first destroyed property at the houses of three independence 
supporters. Manuel Pinto died in the third of these attacks, in which Eurico 
participated. 

At about 1pm, still led by Eurico, the group arrived at the house of Manuel 
Carrascalao, located next door to Eurico Guterres' Gardapaksi (later Aitarak) 
Dili headquarters. Other militia members had gathered outside it earlier, and 
inside were about 100 pro-independence refugees. Sensing the impending attack, 
Carrascalao and his daughter Christina had appealed for protection directly to 
East Timor military commander Col Tono Suratman but the latter did not respond. 
Carrascalao then appealed to some armed Brimob policemen, who also refused to 
act immediately. 

On 18 February 2002 Guterres was indicted in absentia before the Serious Crimes 
Panel in Dili District Court over these 17 April attacks. Seventeen others, 
including eight TNI members, are mentioned in the same indictment. The 
indictment states clearly which members of the party of militiamen and soldiers 
were responsible for killing each of the twelve victims and seriously injuring 
five others inside Carrascalao's house that day.[6] Eurico was present while 
bodies were dumped into the well.[7]

Afterwards Col Tono Suratman gave Eurico Tavares and Joao Tavares some 
cardboard boxes full of money - which turned out to be counterfeit![8] The 
contents of some of the many communications between Suratman and Guterres at 
this time and later in the year were leaked in March 2002 by sources within the 
Australian Defence Signals Directorate.[9]

Two days after the murders at Manuel Carrascalao's house, Dili district head 
Domingos Soares appointed him chief of a 'voluntary civil security force' (Pam 
Swakarsa, also called Kamra) for Dili.[10] The appointment was little noted at 
the time but attracted widespread international condemnation when it was 
confirmed by Col Tono Suratman and by East Timor police chief Col (Pol) Timbul 
Silaen in early June. His Aitarak militia used the police station at Komoro, 
Dili, as its base. Apart from Guterres' own record of violence, the appointment 
contravened the UN Agreement, which made the Indonesian police alone 
responsible for security in East Timor.

Thereafter Eurico Guterres attended numerous militia rallies around East Timor, 
which were always well attended by government and military officials. At one 
such rally in Atsabae near Maliana at the end of April he admitted having 
ordered the killings at Manuel Carrascalao's house, saying the aim was to kill 
Carrascalao himself.[11]

On 10-11 May 99 he led an attack on Quintal Bo'ot village in Santa Cruz, a 
suburb of Dili, that left several civilians dead.[12]

On 24 July 1999, according to one (uncorroborated) report, Eurico Guterres and 
Maj-Gen Zacky Anwar Makarim were both present at a secret six-hour meeting of 
militia and military leaders in Dili to plan action after the ballot. 

Makarim gave Guterres a list of 370 people to be eliminated, as well as 
detailed plans to instigate riots, target and assassinate proindependence 
leaders, and fully mobilise militias and the armed forces.[13] 

In 26 August 1999, just four days before the ballot, Guterres told a rally of 
15,000 in Dili that the city would become a 'sea of fire' if independence was 
declared. Afterwards his men killed two pro-independence East Timorese while 
police looked on passively.[14] 

In the critical days between 30 August and 6 September 1999 Guterres and his 
men ruled the streets of Dili, and controlled the harbour and airport, 
issuing 'exit permits' to ensure no pro-independence people escaped his net. 
They were also busy burning down the city and forcibly organising everyone in 
Dili onto any available transport for the evacuation to West Timor. 

On 5 September men in Aitarak uniform and led by Mateus Carvalho, with the 
participation of TNI officer Capt Agus Suwarno, attacked the diocesan chambers 
(Camra Eclesestica), leaving an estimated 15 dead and 15-20 wounded. 

The next day, 6 September, Aitarak militiamen and TNI personnel including 
Kopassus elite troops, totalling about 100 men and allegedly led by Kostrad 
officers, torched the official residence of Bishop Belo. More than 5000 
refugees sheltering there were moved first to the police headquarters in Dili 
and then into Indonesian-controlled West Timor. At least one person was killed 
(see LtCol Sujarwo).[15]

On 28 February 2003 Eurico Guterres was indicted again before the Dili special 
panel, with several others, for his role in the attack on the Dili diocese and 
Bishop Belo’s house on 5 and 6 September 1999 respectively, and for his role in 
forcibly transferrring over 25,000 civilians from Dili to West Timor in the 
period 5 to 9 September. Those indicted at this time, all in absentia, were 
(Case 13/ 2003):

Eurico Guterres, Aitarak commander 
Col (Pol) Timbul Silaen, East Timor police chief 
Capt Agus Suwarno, officer at East Timor military command 
Adolfo Viera Liao, TNI soldier 
Mateus de Carvalho, Aitarak D Company commander in Hera 
Marcelino [last name unknown], deputy commander of Aitarak C Company, based in 
Becora, Dili 
Caetano da Silva, Aitarak post commander under Marcelino’s command 
Antonio Ximenes Brito, Aitarak militia member 

After the Indonesian pullout, Eurico Guterres moved to Kupang, where he 
established a newspaper (Timor File), and the Gema Insan Bumi Lorosae 
Foundation. 

Despite his role in the violence in East Timor both before and immediately 
after the 30 August 1999 ballot, Eurico Guterres continued to have regular 
meetings with senior military and civilian government officials, who treated 
him like a government functionary. In June 1999 he was selected by the state 
party Golkar to stand for election in the national parliament. In March 2000 he 
left Golkar for the PDIP, saying this party had done more than any other to 
help keep East Timor within Indonesia. In August 2000 PDIP chairperson Megawati 
made him chief of Banteng Pemuda, a PDIP security group. 


When questioned by KPP HAM in December 1999, he was unrepentant about his own 
role and blamed President Habibie for the violence in East Timor (through the 
latter's decision to abandon the province).

Although the militias were ostensibly disbanded at a ceremony in December 1999, 
in fact the militia command structure remained intact, as was demonstrated by 
their subsequent control over the refugee camps in West Timor, and their 
organised presence at the funeral of Moruk in September 2000. 

If, overseas, Guterres became a symbol of the Indonesian violence in East 
Timor, within Indonesia he became a national hero of sorts who enjoyed almost 
complete impunity. In June and July 2000 police in Kupang charged him for 
shooting at the tyres of a car, but the judge said he could not decide if 
Guterres was civilian or military and therefore dismissed the charge as 'vague'.
[16] On 30 August 2000, the anniversary of the East Timor ballot, Guterres led 
a violent rally in Kupang at which journalists were beaten up and windows 
smashed at the office of the Nusa Tenggara Timur governor.[17]  

In October 2000 a judge in Dili (now under Untaet administration) named Eurico 
Guterres a suspect for crimes against humanity, issued an arrest warrant, and 
applied to Indonesia to have him extradited. Jakarta refused to extradite 
Guterres but invited an Untaet team to come to Jakarta to interview him. 
However, he refused to meet Untaet officials who had been permitted to come to 
Jakarta in March 2001.   

Eurico Guterres was only indicted within Indonesia after considerable 
prevarication. In October 2000, under considerable international pressure 
(foreign governments were meeting in Tokyo at the time under the aegis of CGI 
to consider fresh loans to Indonesia), police in Jakarta put him up on a 
weapons charge. The Jakarta court initially dismissed the charge on a 
technicality, but police persisted and he was eventually (30 April 2001) 
sentenced to six months prison. Despite considerable international outrage 
about the lightness of the sentence, he was allowed to serve most of it under 
house arrest in a comfortable Jakarta residence. He was released in June 2001.  

Throughout these proceedings Eurico Guterres had the vocal support of most of 
the political elite, as represented by parliamentary speakers Amien Rais and 
Akbar Tanjung. A PDIP group in Semarang claiming to represent several political 
parties awarded him the 'Red and White Award' in November 2000.

In May 2001, while still in 'prison', he was made head of an 'Anti Communist 
Alliance' (AAK) that intimidated bookshops around Indonesia to 
withdraw 'communist' books from its shelves. The alliance was allegedly 
supported by figures within Golkar.[18] 

Although the Attorney General had added his name in October 2000 to a list of 
men suspected of human rights abuse, it was dropped again in May 2001 following 
pressure on President Wahid by the military. Nevertheless, on 31 May 2002 
Eurico Guterres was formally indicted before the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court in 
Indonesia with crimes against humanity. He was accused of failing to prevent 
his Aitarak and other PPI militias from attacking Manuel Carrascalao's house on 
17 April following his provocative speech.[19]

On 27 November 2002 the Indonesian court sentenced him to ten years 
imprisonment. Amid a string of acquittals, it was the longest of only two 
convictions handed down (the other was against Abilio Soares, also East 
Timorese). However, he remained free while awaiting an appeal - a solution to 
please all sides increasingly being adopted by judges in Jakarta.[20]

Other former Aitarak members indicted in Dili are these:

Aje Pareira (26) and Beni Ludji (40) were arrested near the border in East 
Timor in April 2003. They were charged in Dili with murdering Guido Ximenes 
Goviea, village head of Mascarenhas, Dili, in September 1999. Beni Ludji is an 
Indonesian and a former TNI soldier with Battalion 745 based in Baucau, was 
Aitarak Company A commander in 1999. He was in charge of operations for the 
Aitarak militia. He was carrying a SGI card when arrested.[21] 

Domingos Amati and Francisco Matos were indicted before the Dili special panel 
(Case 12/ 2003) for murdering a passerby in Hera, Dili district, on 5 September 
1999. 

Background
Eurico Guterres turned 28 in 1999. He was born in Uatulari, near Viqueque in 
eastern East Timor. He explains his pro-Indonesian feelings by saying his 
parents were killed by Fretilin, but independent sources say they were in fact 
killed by TNI in 1976 for their pro-Fretilin views. He was brought up by an 
Indonesian civil servant in Viqueque, then moved to Dili where he did his 
junior high school. He could not complete his senior high school education at 
the Sacred Heart of Jesus Catholic school in Becora, Dili. At this time he 
became involved in (semi-)criminal and petty gangster activity, especially at 
the government-protected gambling hall (bola guling) at Tacitolu, Dili. He is 
also thought to have been an activist in the pro-independence clandestine 
movement Santo Antonio.[22]

In 1988 military intelligence detained him for his alleged involvement in a 
plot to assassinate President Suharto, who visited Dili in October of that 
year. From that time on he was 'turned' and became an informer for Kopassus. 
The energetic counter-insurgency officer Prabowo Subianto took a special 
interest in his abilities. He continued as a double agent for some time, 
apparently playing a role in the pro-independence protests during the pope's 
visit in late 1989, but after that he was expelled from the movement. He went 
to Suai but still did not finish his high school. 

In 1994 Prabowo recruited him into Gardapaksi. The organisation gave cheap 
loans to help unemployed young people start small businesses, but also used 
them as informants and to man pro-military vigilante squads. Governor Abilio 
Soares strongly supported Gardapaksi, which developed a record of human rights 
abuse. 

The military supposedly arranged a high school graduation certificate that 
allowed him to attend the Economics Institute (Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Ekonomi, 
STIE, run by pro-integrationist Filomeno Hornay) in Dili in 1997. Here too he 
completed only three semesters. He is married to the niece of Bishop Nascimento 
of Baucau, and has three children.[23]

Extra Information

Implicated in Events:
Belo - 6/09/1999 - Attack on Bishop Belo's house, Dili
Carrascalao - 17/04/1999 - Murder of 12 at home of Manuel Carrascalao, Dili
Diocese - 5/09/1999 - Attack on Dili diocesan office
Liquica - 6/04/1999 - Liquica church massacre

Current Status:
T - Committed for trial in East Timor, some already sentenced. 
A - (Indonesian) Attorney General's Department. Announced as suspects at 
various times (September 2000 - April 2001), some later dropped, some already 
sentenced. 
K - KPP HAM. Listed in the 31/01/2000 report of the Indonesian commission of 
inquiry into atrocities committed in East Timor in 1999. More junior figures in 
Appendix 5 of the final report are added here under their superiors. 

See map of location 
This individual is also mentioned in these profiles: 
Sgt Anwar 
Cancio Lopes de Carvalho 
Mateus de Carvalho 
Herminio da Costa 
MajGen Adam Damiri 
Manuel de Sousa 
MajGen Zacky Anwar Makarim 
Sera Malik 
Olivio Moruk 
Col Nur Muis 
LtCol Endar Priyanto 
Col (Pol) Timbul Silaen 
BrigGen Mahidin Simbolon 
Abilio Soares 
Laurentino ('Moko') Soares 
Domingos Soares 
Armindo Soares Mariano 
LtGen (ret) Prabowo Subianto Djojohadikusumo 
LtCol Yayat Sudrajat 
Col Tono Suratman 
Joao Tavares 
Maj Bambang Wisnumurthy 
-------------------------------------------
[1] James Dunn, 'Crimes against humanity in East Timor, January to October 
1999: Their nature and causes', Sydney Morning Herald, 28 April 2001.
[2] Annemarie Evans, 'East Timor: Militia leader picked to head secret group', 
South China Morning Post, 21 September 1999.
[3] 'East Timor under the Indonesian jackboot: An analysis of Indonesian army 
documents', Tapol, 15 November 1998.
[4] Joanna Jolly, 'Militias vow to rise from the ashes', South China Morning 
Post, 19 November 1999.
[5] Reporters sans frontieres, 'RSF annual report 2000 (East Timor section)', 
RSF (Vincent Brossel - Asia Pacific Desk <asie at rsf.fr>), 2 May 2000; 'Timor 
excerpt from Annual Report "Attacks on the Press in 1999"', Committee to 
Protect Journalists (CPJ, 
http://www.cpj.org/attacks99/frameset_att99/frameset_att99.html, 22 March 2000.
[6] Case 2/ 2002, Serious Crimes indictment (summary on JSMP website). They 
were Eurico Guterres, Manuel [de] Sousa, Joao Sera aka Joao Loumeza (BMP vice-
commander for Liquica), Floriano Da Silva aka Floriana Dato Meta (BMP commander 
in Gugleur, Liquica), Marculino Soares (BMP commander in Guico, Liquica), Tome 
Diogo (sergeant, intelligence officer at Liquica district military command), 
Jose Mateus (TNI member), Antonio Gomes (TNI member), Antonio Bescau (TNI 
member), Antoninho Martins (TNI member), Teofilo da Silva Ribeiro (TNI member), 
Abilio Lopez da Cruz (TNI member), Jorge Viegas (TNI intelligence officer in 
Maubara), Mateus Metan (BMP member), Domingos Bondia (BMP member), Fernando 
Sousa (BMP member), and Armindo Carrion (BMP member). Several of these figures 
also turned up in the indictment for the Liquica church massacre that had taken 
place less than two weeks previously (see LtCol Asep Kuswani for military names 
and Leonito Martins for civilian ones).
[7] Amnesty International, 'East Timor: Seize the moment', 21 June 1999, ASA 
21/49/99. This report also describes how four days earlier Eurico Guterres had 
presented the governor with a list of pro-independence civil servants who in 
Aitarak's opinion should be sacked. On Aitarak generally see Amnesty 
International, 'Indonesia: Struggle against impunity - one step forward, two 
steps back', AI Index ASA 21/008/2001 - News Service Nr. 74, 25 April 2001.
[8] 'Milisi pro-integrasi teman siapa? - Whose friends are the pro-integration 
militia?', Cari (on Charles Coppel news list), 13 October, 2000. It is not 
clear exactly when this money was handed over - quite likely more than once.  
Other items on the counterfeit money are 'Sejumlah jendral tersinggung dengan 
usulan penyelesaian damai Timtim', MateBEAN, 19 April 1999; 'Two ex-soldiers 
jailed for counterfeiting', The Jakarta Post, 22 September 2000. The 
counterfeiting operation was later traced to LtGen Tyasno Sudarto, at the time 
head of military intelligence (Kepala BIA), who in turn claimed to be acting 
under orders from Gen Wiranto.
[9] Hamish McDonald, 'Australia's bloody East Timor secret', 'Silence over a 
crime against humanity', Sydney Morning Herald, 14 March 2002.
[10] Conor O'Clery, 'Indonesia's promise on Timor is deeply suspect', Irish 
Times [Dublin], 21 April 1999.  
[11] 'East Timor: Pro-Jakarta militia leader admits ordering April 17 attack on 
house of Manuel Carrascalao', Lusa, 3 May 1999.
[12] 'Fortilos>Fokupers: Berita dari Timtim', MateBEAN, 13 May 1999; 'Pratiwi: 
Catatan perjalanan di Bumi Loro Sa'e (10)', MateBEAN, 8 October 1999.
[13] 'Make your own militia: How the military did it and who knew', New 
Internationalist, No. 318, November 1999.
[14] James Dunn, 'Crimes against humanity in East Timor, January to October 
1999: Their nature and causes', Sydney Morning Herald, 28 April 2001.
[15] 'Human rights questions: Human rights situations and reports of special 
rapporteurs and representatives: Situation of human rights in East Timor', 
United Nations  A/54/660 General Assembly, Fifty-fourth session, Agenda item 116
(c) (in accordance with resolution 1999/S-4/1 of 27 September 1999 at the UN 
Human Rights Commission), 10 December 1999.
[16] 'Kupang District Court awaits', Gatra, 21 October 2000.
[17] see East Timor Observatory/Observaterio Timor Leste/Observatoire Timor-
Oriental, 'POL01: Political movements and parties: pro- autonomy', CDPM, 12 
February 2001.
[18] 'Phony anti-communism', Tempo Magazine, 15-21 May 2001.
[19] Lindsay Murdoch, 'Ballot violence: Six to go free', Sydney Morning Herald, 
3 May 2001. Indonesian case information on JSMP website 
http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/Indonesia/accusedindo.htm.
[20] Marianne Kearney, “Convicted Timor militia leader Eurico Guterres is 
unlikely to be put behind bars in Jakarta”, South China Morning Post, 29 
November 2002.
[21] ”UN-PKF denies arresting ex pro-integrationist fighters in neutral area”, 
NewsEdge Corporation, 19 May 2003; “HQ PKF Infosum 101/03(100800i Apr 03 to 
110800i Apr 03)”, Unmiset PKF HQ, 11 April 2003.
[22] 'Pratiwi: Catatan perjalanan di Bumi Loro Sa'e (10)', MateBEAN, 8 October 
1999.
[23] Annemarie Evans, 'East Timor: Militia leader picked to head secret group', 
South China Morning Post, 21 September 1999. Gamma says he was born 17 July 
1974, but that is unlikely to be true ('Anak muda yang bangkit dari wacana 
berbahaya', Gamma, 17 October 2000).
-end-